—Nicholas Syrianus Katsafanas

The only Final Fantasy 7 epic poem you'll ever need, guaranteed!

Cloud Strife, indulging in a few days off from mercenary work in the Sector 7 slums, begins to experience an inkling that his essence may be virtually emanated, mostly while he's drinking somewhat excessively at a so-called “friend’s” bar, Seventh Heaven.

 

Download the PDF at 2gyroz.neocities.org

 

The Madness of a Cloud (1st Edition)
Echoes: 8,536
Syllables: 12,015
Approximate Self-Similarity: .7104
Mean Line Length: 375.47 syllables
Distance from 377: -0.41%

Epilogue
Echoes: 2,474
Syllables: 3,446
Approximate Self-Similarity: .7179
Mean Line Length: 143.58 syllables
Distance from 144: -0.29%

 

(c) 2025 Nicholas Syrianus Katsafanas

5.5x5.5 saddle stitched 64pp

ISBN: 979-8-9987102-4-7

Canto I of The Madness of a Cloud (.730) spoken aloud.

Canto I (3rd Edition)
“The Nice Man with his Wife’s Last Name’s Form of Annihilation”
1859:2546
.730

Cloud was sitting at Seventh Heaven drinking a Fernet on the rocks engaging in light conversation with a cocksucker he’d never even met about a Queen’s Blood play-in game that he’d - this particular cocksucker - requested to be put on the TV at the bar. Well, actually Cloud .corrected, for the record, that he’d actually been reading a few pages of Timaeus prior to all this, making a few disparate notes, finding himself puzzled at the sensory information that continued to be relayed into his brain. Cloud basically alleged he was flummoxed about the sensory information that became, in some way, relayed to what he guessed was his brain? - how any of that was corroborated, but more so Cloud contemplated the static nature of said images - that’s what he was specifically contemplating when a guy with a round-ass face leaned onto the bar, seeking to close his tab, obviously excited to tell the bartender that he may need to show her his ID, just because he took his wife’s last name and hadn’t had a chance to change his license yet? The patron with the round-ass face noted how nice the bartender was (Tifa!), but what was her name again? He could definitely display his ID if she really needed, just because, again, his last name was different now - taking his wife’s name and all! Of course, Cloud noted, that it was clear that no one gave a fuck about the printed name on a credit card in that bar, and Tifa, for her part, didn’t exactly seem like she was ramping up to suck this dude off just because he was a radical feminist. For Cloud’s part he was still, you know, attempting to get behind the blunt sensations being smuggled relentlessly into his so-called conscious existence. Everything was an image to some extent, right Aerith? Touch itself was a fucking sensory image. It was a quaint Spring evening where Cloud felt more or less destined to philosophize, having started drinking wine in preparation for a Friday night dinner, only to have Tifa bail last minute, because she needed to pick up a bar shift - leaving him completely free to continue this wine drinking in a ritualistic way that would be conducive to philosophical ideas. Yes, Cloud continued to Aerith, it was basically only via drinking alone, but in a ritualistic fashion, that he’d achieved any sort of philosophical inquiry. You couldn’t just sit at a desk and become philosophical, at least not for Cloud! Maybe some people could! But, no, not Cloud. He’d imagine that there were probably a litany of possible ways of becoming philosophical - like, for instance, for the round-faced albino chap, perhaps telling Tifa that he’d taken his wife’s last name, maybe that could be seen as possibly ritualistic in a way, a gateway to some sort of becoming philosophical. This was actually science, Cloud told her he thought at the bar, successfully avoiding making any eye contact with the round-faced man. Was it necessarily strange at all that once the Greeks went extinct philosophy went more or less completely and utterly downhill and never looked back in the least, that the last group to really reach much of any philosophical success made a sincere effort to conjoin getting fucked up with contemplating intelligible phenomena? - that these Greeks attempted to marry inebriation and rigorous dialectic? That all thought since - to paraphrase Northhead - had been a minor footnote to Plato or whatever? The thing was, according to Cloud, you just couldn’t willy nilly delve into metaphysics completely sober! But that wasn’t to say a person should necessarily become some degenerate alcoholic either, because a degenerate drunk would in no way make a great meta-physicist either - that was basically impossible, because, like Cloud said, the solo mode of inebriation should be done ritualistically, in spurts, at certain times. You couldn’t just be like hitting the bottle as soon as you woke from a slumber! - after said inebriation sessions you’d require sobriety to parse through whatever it was that came to you via said contemplation, no? In fact, the actual science was nothing beyond this parsing through of inebriation sessions of rigorous contemplation! That was it - what laid behind logic and metaphysics, in Cloud’s mind at least! But inebriation could be anything really - Cloud could enter a state of inebriation in a car alone on a Tuesday AM, without consuming a damn thing. Aerith more or less agreed, adding that on the one hand a philosophical mind should be able to analyze, interpret, extrapolate, all of that scientific stuff - but, on the other, if you fail to place yourself in a position to receive anything to analyze, interpret, or extrapolate then you were basically screwed! Cloud more or less agreed but added that - sans this type of “inspiration,” so to speak - they’d be stuck sitting at a table just noodling around nonsensically, vacillating back and forth between two types of nothingness, and then just probably knocking off someone else’s work by accident. But none of this was new! It wasn’t like Cloud was breaking news in any way. At this point Aerith asked - you know, was this albino douche bag, he was an element of this analysis? No, not really - according to Cloud - maybe the guy was trying a tad too hard? - to present himself as a specific archetype to the general public, as a guy who decided to spit in the face of his own chromosome count, which was something Cloud personally endorsed! Granted Cloud probably wouldn’t do it by taking his wife’s last name, because Cloud personally was obviously more prone to a type of isolated and overly dramatic self-annihilation than a subservient and disingenuously muted feminist annihilation, but he wasn’t ipso facto opposed to either! Aerith agreed one hundred percent! But Cloud still would go a little further, noting that in the intelligible sphere, as someone like, say, Proclus would note, that so-called forms were somehow able to participate in one another without mixing, whereas within the sensible realm they participated in things and subsequently got dirty. But Cloud thought that it was worth going one step further - since they were discussing annihilation and stuff anyway, that the perceived mixing between forms that took place in the sensible arena was itself just a projection of mixture but not actual mixture. The intelligible sphere, being purely emanated, participated within itself without mixing itself, while in the sensible sphere it didn’t seem like that was possible, that by participating within sensible things they became essentially mixed with them, assuming they were categorically sensible. Essentially nature was tainted, which of course Cloud and Aerith knew all too well! Way too well! Hence their shared acquiescence toward occasional annihilation! But even this sensible filth, so to speak, Cloud thought, this perceived mixing up in the participation of sensible things, wasn’t it also a projection? - an emanation, just as the participation of the intelligible sphere was also an emanation of the primary unity of all things? Which, yeah, brought Cloud back to that albino round-faced fuck at the bar, taking his wife’s last name - because ultimately the albino’s vantage point wasn’t remarkably divergent from Cloud’s or Aerith’s, Cloud thought. This albino was promoting a certain type of annihilation of their cultural-sensible realm, thinking that the patriarchal lineage of their society was basically something objectionable, something essentially tainted, that should be annihilated in the service of something more pure. Okay, well, Cloud thought that made a modicum of sense! Maybe taking his wife’s last name was in a sense a greater form of purity than locking a woman in a kitchen and expecting a blowjob every other evening, Cloud thought. Just as Proclus and Socrates sensed that the intelligible sphere participated with itself yet not in a way where it mixed with itself, that this was distinct from our further descended, sensible sphere where things participated with one another but got mixed up in the process - well, maybe this albino man was noting that the patriarchy was a participatory mixing that left unseemly cum stains - for lack of a better phrase! - on human experience. Patriarchy, in the albino man’s mind, should be annihilated because of this sensible mixing up, this putrid tainting of what would be better off pure. And taking your nice wife’s name was a proper mode of annihilation in response. Aerith remarked that she knew Cloud would inevitably bring the discourse back to this poor chap closing his tab, but, just to be clear, what Cloud was saying was that this mixing that occurred in the sensible realm was itself just a separate projection - just a lesser mode of projecting! So while the material world may have disgusted them, perhaps moving the two toward some sort of all-encompassing conceptual annihilation, and as much as the patriarchy might have seemed putrid to the albino husband at the bar who looked to annihilate himself by taking his nice wife’s last name, it could be wise to consider that these disgusting aggregates were themselves simply derivative projections, that they weren’t actual mixtures, that they were just derivative emanations as opposed to tattoos of what they thought they despised. Aerith was aware. She wasn’t distressed about it, but she knew this poor albino guy would in time take the brunt of it from Cloud. Cloud questioned whether he didn’t deserve it? Plus like they’d already implied - they must to proceed from the immanent to the transcendent, no?

KATREENA DAYACAP - BLUE HYDRANGEA

Coming soon

"Nothing can separate love, and I know this to be true. Gathering my thoughts, journal entries, poetry and prose from the last eight years has been incredibly difficult. I held off for a very long time in fear of bringing myself through those painful memories before, during and after my mother’s death. But here it is. By finally opening up to all the change since my mom passed, I’m able to find inner peace and with that, true healing. I love you, Mom. I prayed and hoped that we would beat cancer. We fought against your disease together and gave each other strength through that unimaginable struggle. I know you are with me in spirit and there helping me rebuild my life and become open to all that has changed since I lost you. I know it is natural for me to miss you, even now. I wish we could make new memories together, but I hope you know that the memories of the time we spent together will always bring me happiness." - Tree

—Nicholas Syrianus Katsafanas

Adam Metropolis and Larry Isosceles, two moderately opinionated men, engage in two extended monologues on the nature of the number 1.99999 repeating and various theories of the Western world.

 

Download the PDF at 2gyroz.neocities.org

 

Metropolis ("The Number 1.99999 Repeating")

Echoes: 8,809
Syllables: 11,704
Approximate Self-Similarity: .753

Isosceles ("Theories of the Western World")

Echoes: 12,279
Syllables: 16,742
Approximate Self-Similarity: .733

 

(c) 2021, 2023 Nicholas Syrianus Katsafanas

ISBN: 979-8-9987102-3-0

5x8 Perfect Bound 76pp

Jazz Singing About Suicide - s/t LP

Very Special Fractal Jazz Singing
Drum Programming: 144 BPM or 233 BPM
Verses: 377 SPM (+/- 5%) (Syllables Per Minute)
Lyrics: 3 or 5 lines - each line between 34 and 55 syllables
(8th interval of Fibonacci sequence)

The Number 1.99999 Repeating: First 6 Lines (2nd Edition)

Nicholas Syrianus Katsafanas

from Metropolis + Isosceles

.774 - .852 - .753 - .747 - .776 - .705  

Line 01 (.774): We hadn’t been there ninety seconds, because it was right as we walked in the backyard of the high school graduation party that her cousin approached us and, without the slightest hesitation, asked my girlfriend right to her face---‘Did you bring my tupperware with you?’ It took perhaps longer than I care to confess to fully recognize what exactly it was she was referencing. Oh, the oxtail, I reflected, a second or so later, as I recalled there being a beautiful, wood-covered, piece of glass of tupperware sitting in our refrigerator for over a week, incubating an oxtail dish that had, unfortunately, totally expired---it was so far gone I was hesitant to even open the top of the tupperware container, despite the fact the top of the container was a beautiful, wood finished piece. There was no doubt in my mind that this oxtail was, at that point, not just completely expired but essentially a type of meat soup, a type of liquified corpse, which of course disgusted me severely. Cleaning it out struck me as a grotesque idea. I can’t say for certain, but it’s more likely than not that I threw it into the trash-tupperware, wood top, and oxtail. ‘Oh, so sorry, I’ll definitely bring it back soon!’ she said, and I glanced at her and attempted to decipher if she had any idea the tupperware and the oxtail were both long gone, that both now sat in a garbage heap, a pile of trash somewhere, at the bottom of a public dump, still filled with decayed, grotesque oxtail, and that her cousin would never again own the privilege of placing her leftovers into that piece of tupperware with the beautiful wood cover. That tupperware was finished. Having said that, even the finest piece of tupperware---how precious is it really? Couldn’t we replace it for five dollars or less? My thinking at the time was yes, that the tupperware was entirely fungible, yet as soon as we stepped foot into this high school graduation party her cousin inquired about the tupperware---as if this tupperware perhaps belonged to some sort of rare species of tupperware, perhaps a species of tupperware on the verge of extinction, perhaps this was some kind of one-of-a-kind tupperware I nonchalantly tossed into a pile of trash. Some people have massive amounts of respect for tupperware, but I’ve never been one of them, it always eluded me why anyone would invest more than one dollar into a piece of tupperware, personally. To my mind, if a piece of tupperware, no matter the level of craftsmanship, is priced above one dollar, then it’s an overpriced piece of tupperware. It’s just not an item I’ve personally ever viewed as an investment of any kind. In my mind, plates and bowls are relatively worthwhile investments, while tupperware is essentially a capitalist ploy to increase the profit margin on plastic bags-to convince people they shouldn’t only invest in plates and bowls, but also invest in the highest quality plastic bags (tupperware), that in theory they’ll use again and again, but in practice they’ll lose incessantly and constantly have to replace. 

Line 02 (.852): ‘She’s never getting that tupperware back,’ I said. ‘You threw it in the trash?’ she said. ‘You gave the okay?’ I said, to which she shook her head, clearly misremembering the plethora of times we’ve thrown out tupperware in the past, the countless times I’ve seen a piece of well-worn tupperware taking up space in our refrigerator, asked her if I could throw said tupperware out, received approval to throw said tupperware out, and thrown out said tupperware. ‘It’s not a problem,’ I said, ‘we can probably just buy her a replacement or something.’ She agreed but seemed dubious, and I felt the same, I found myself agreeing with both myself and my girlfriend, despite the fact we had diametrically opposed views on this tupperware. My girlfriend and I disagreed on our ability to replace this tupperware, and I agreed with both of us. I sat in a lawn chair a second or so later, drinking a glass of Soju, explicitly attempting to avoid any unnecessary interaction at this high school graduation until I’d imbibed at least half this bottle of Soju, doubting my ability to come off appropriately cordial in a social setting sans a minimum of half of a bottle of this Soju ruthlessly percolating through my bloodstream. I sat there, contemplating high school graduations, contemplating my own high school graduation, recalling nothing of my high school graduation, contemplating the pervasive idiocy of organized education, considering how more or less every unique thinker---from Socrates stoned by the Athenians to Giordano Bruno burnt alive by the Catholic church to Nietzsche unread and in an insane asylum as he rotted away---yes, every unique thinker over the course of human history was either intensely ostracized or simply assassinated by the systematic educators of his or her day. In short, I was vociferously drinking this glass of Soju when I thought to myself---Isn’t it possible that we think of the theological philosophers as the conservatives, as the ones restrained by this so-called conception of God, yet it’s actually the case that the theological philosophers, over the course of human history, are the most audacious, the boldest philosophers we have and have ever had? How else can we explain Berkeley, I thought---easily the most radical skeptic the modern West has produced, yet also a Catholic priest? Dionysius, for example, was actually quite vigorous in his skepticism of our ability to know anything, his circumlocutions were actually quite radical. Whereas our typical secular atheist philosopher, while assured of our ability to know there are no Gods, is rather neutered in his philosophical speculations if the fact that God doesn’t exist is left to the side. Isn’t it possible that the so-called theological philosophers are the most audacious among us? The ones who are willing to take the properly radical leaps necessary when dealing with metaphysics, I thought while vociferously drinking this bottle of Soju, unwilling to speak to anyone at this high school graduation until I had thoroughly contemplated the true nature of the theological philosopher.

Line 03 (.753): How else can we explain Kierkegaard? The secular philosophers talk our ears off and more often than not say nothing beyond what their thesis advisors demand to be printed, I thought, vociferously drinking this bottle of Soju, while the apex of the theological philosopher truly enacts the notion of philosophizing with a hammer? Yet, in our era, it seems we more or less dismiss all philosophers who choose to believe in God, I thought. Is it then possible, I thought, drinking my Soju, vociferously, that because the theological philosophers have been essentially shunned from the modern academy, that the mere mention of God is anathema to the modern academy, that because the theological philosopher has been holistically banned from partaking in the modern so-called academy, our modern organized educators, that they’ve therefore managed to maneuver outside of the stifling bureaucracy of the university---and actually engaged with original thought? Should we consider that possible? That they echo early Christian theologians, persecuted by pagan Roman authorities, who created elaborate frameworks that formed the sui generis metaphysical foundation of early Christian thought, a sui generis synthesis of the canonical Gospels with Neoplatonic thought, that our modern theologians, almost regardless of denomination, prosecuted by the atheist university bureaucrats, are working within perhaps similarly radical frameworks? After all, secular academic philosophers are loath to speculate on much of anything in our era. In their place we have theoretical physicists who employ complex mathematics to prove the susceptibility of complex mathematics to almost any type of sophistry. Frankly, I’ve never respected mathematicians, I should admit that much upfront. I suppose, in my own way, I’ve always viewed mathematicians as essentially charlatans. I view the art of mathematics as not only decadent, but I also view the concept of number as an essentially metaphysical domain. The mathematician’s formulas are always derivative of the numerical axioms of metaphysics---it’s always struck me as entirely possible that numbers are an impossibility. That the introduction of the decimal point, of the fraction, essentially sank mathematics right in its place, in my eyes at least. Of course, I’m at bottom a disciple of Palamas, for certain, I was inadvertently baptized as a disciple of Palamas, of course, I fundamentally disagree with this modern idea that we can comprehend everything in a purely intellectual fashion, this notion that there’s, in practice, no limit to the human intellect. I find that idea to be one of the most absolutely absurd. Sure, of course, we can read, say, Parmenides and, while it’s impressive, it’s also entirely absurd, and I personally enjoy it immensely, but on those merits. I’m not sure I’d base my scientific thought on it. I’m at least less than certain it’d become the cornerstone of my secular intellectual pursuits. Parmenides is one of the perfect works of absurdist fiction written in any language, and if we indeed made it a cornerstone of our secular intellectual pursuits, then at least we’d need to recognize our absurdist origins, as Dionysius rightfully does. Yet we’ve employed Parmenides for centuries as a fundamental commentary on allegedly rationalist notions. Allegedly rationalist notions---is this not what we find ourselves steeped in, more or less night and day? When I comment on metaphysics I do so in a consciously absurd fashion, because I recognize the limits of language, the limits of language that at bottom are incapable of communicating metaphysics in linear and/or rational fashions. It seems somewhat obvious that there’s a nefarious literalism at play here, I think it’s safe to say that. Ever since grade school I was positive that I stood in the presence of a nefarious literalism. Even as a young boy, instinctively, I knew numbers were, in all likelihood, impossibilities, and that my systematic education was highly susceptible to, if not entirely complicit in, a nefarious literalism. The education of my youth didn’t exactly encourage audacious thought. 

Line 04 (.747): In any case, we can’t compose metaphysics in a rational sense, can we? Isn’t it always in a between-the-lines sense that we compose metaphysics, in winks and nods that we write metaphysics, because we can’t write metaphysics in a linear and/or rational fashion? We take far too much at face value. Our literalism is intentionally or unintentionally nefarious. Because the reality is nearly nothing can be taken at face value. Do you really believe the greatest minds of Antiquity intended to be taken at face value? The Byzantines read Plato the same way we read Dostoyevsky, whereas we read Plato the same way the Byzantines read the Gospels. Perhaps both are absurd. Now, sure, I’m without a doubt, from a certain vantage point at least, a disciple of Palamas, I won’t attempt to deny that, but we can’t take everything Palamas put to papyrus at face value either. Although Palamas understood the shortcomings of Antiquity better than even the most progressive modern scholar, I’d be the last one to say I take everything the saint wrote at face value, because I’m far from a literalist. The modern scholar, insofar as he keeps his faith in rationalism, will most likely never come to terms with the nature of Antiquity---is that fair to say? He’ll read Parmenides and take everything literally, and in taking everything literally he’ll inevitably take everything idiotically. Isn’t it the case that the theologians are the greatest skeptics among us? We view faith as poison as we retain fanatical levels of faith in our sensory organs. We peruse a variety of empirical studies that vivisect the grotesque fictions of our sensory organs-did you know it’s now speculated human beings didn’t see the color blue until the latter BC centuries at earliest? All around us our sensory organs excrete evidence of their utter unreliability, yet we view faith as idiocy while retaining this fanatical notion that our sensory organs can and should and must be trusted---which is why we’re not quite radical enough. The modern age retains radical faith in its sensory organs in a more fanatical fashion than any historical religion known to man. Nothing can be taken at face value, that much we should agree on, which brings me to this, a true fly in the ointment, so to speak---how is it you arrive at a postulation of an essence you cannot know? This is the question, is it not? How does the mathematician reach the postulation numbers are actual and distinct? How is it possible, given human capabilities, to distinguish the number two from the number one point nine repeating (1.9999999…) in practice? How is it possible to distinguish two from one point nine repeating? How does mathematics attempt to lay any claim to physical space-to attempt to claim the ability to leave the theoretical---when it’s impossible for us to distinguish the number two from the number one point nine repeating (1.9999999999999999999999...), in practice? It seems impossible for us to know that the number two is in fact the number two, and not the number one point nine repeating (1.9999999999999999…), and if we’re unable to know the number two is in fact the number two then how could it be possible to assert that mathematics has any value outside of the purely theoretical? By instinct perhaps we feel as though the number two is the number two, and the number one is the number one, yes, the mathematical axioms may feel correct, yet the fact remains that we lack the perceptual faculties to distinguish two apples from one point nine repeating (1.99999999999…) apples. When we speak of the Essence of all things we don’t speak any differently---with the exception that our philosophy of an unknowable Essence seeks to put a strict limit on knowledge based on instinctive assumptions, whereas the philosophy of mathematics attempts to indefinitely expand our knowledge based on nothing more than an instinctive assumption, the instinctive assumption that we can successfully distinguish two apples from one point nine repeating (1.999999999999…) apples. 

Line 05 (.776): There’s no doubt that we’re in the midst of something essentially mysterious, that when we discuss the essence of life we think we can make sense of it all, that we’re on the precipice of making sense of ourselves and our surroundings, yet there’s still little doubt we remain in the midst of something essentially mysterious when we begin to think clearly. Thinking is perhaps the most mysterious act of all. Thinking, which we generally believe translates material and immaterial experience into language---into modes that are communicable. Thinking, which attempts to take something such as consuming a juicy pear, an experience that ultimately is confined to personal experience, and extrapolate it in a communicable format to the general populace. Sans thinking, consuming a juicy pear would be something confined to the private sphere-with thinking it’s then presumably allowed to enter the public domain. There is, in fact, no remaining public domain sans thinking, and there’s in essence no thinking sans a public domain. Assuming we consume a juicy pear, thinking Wow, this pear is juicy, but refuse to write it down, to verbally express it to our peers, then the thought Wow, this pear is juicy remains in the purely immaterial realm, it’s existence purely speculative, both the thought and the physical experience remain essentially purely speculative. It’s only when the thought Wow, this pear is juicy enters the public domain that it becomes, perhaps not real, but at least apparent in a more material manner---it’s verified as a real experience and subsequently verified as a real thought. I too consumed a pear, and wow it was also quite juicy! There’s no doubt we’re in the midst of something essentially mysterious here. 

Line 06 (.705): It was just a few months ago, I dreamt an older female engaged me in a liaison, perhaps a sexual liaison---at first she was an older black woman, but then she became an older white woman, and, as she was white, as we sat in an automobile, I entered a hotel room to pay ninety two dollars for our room for the night, then I returned to the car. I was wearing a business suit and she wore business casual attire, there were two small dark, indecipherable forms sitting in the backseat, and she told me she had to go south of the Missouri now, and I replied You mean south of the Mississippi, right?---yet, even setting aside our geographical concerns, her statement struck me as something I already knew, that I knew she was leaving for good, and that her leaving would mark a new start for me, so to speak. When I woke up I felt as though, in an intensely odd and impalpable way, my entire life had followed the path of Eastern Orthodoxy---in a profound manner I felt this, I was wide awake in bed, gazing at a wall thinking my entire life has somehow tracked the tenets of the Eastern Orthodox, that this dream was equally corporeal to any waking experience I’ve had, and now, months later, I remain curious with regard to the identity of this multi-racial figure from my dream, who it seems engaged me in a sexual liaison? Despite affirming the mysterious nature of what we’re in the midst of, I’ve never been a believer in angels and demons, so to speak---yet this figure from my dream, it seems to me, shared many characteristics with historical reports of so-called angels and demons. Of course, assuming it’s one of the two, which one of the two is it? An angel or a demon? Who were the dark, nearly formless figures in the backseat of the car? A person engages me in a sexual liaison, but at first is black, but then becomes white, then tells me she now has to go quote-unquote south of the Missouri, I correct her, and then I wake up with an intense feeling my life’s somehow followed the tenets of Eastern Orthodoxy---then, this dream’s intensity sticking with me for weeks and even months on end, I question if the figure from my dream was perhaps a being of some metaphysical sort, perhaps an angel or perhaps a demon. I question whether perhaps an angel or perhaps a demon entered my dream to, in a quite serpentine way, point me in the direction of something---perhaps Eastern Orthodoxy. And I question if this is in fact possible. At almost any other time in my life I would have considered it an impossibility, something totally ludicrous, I’d have considered it an embarrassing absurdity to even suggest it. Whereas previously I would have sat and said I considered it to be an embarrassing absurdity and utter impossibility, now, for one reason or another, I actually consider it an embarrassing absurdity to find it utterly impossible.